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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has begun using comparative law in its 
judgments at an early stage. The Court regularly invokes the domestic law of the 
contracting parties, refers to international treaties and cites judgments from Canada, 
the United States, South Africa and other jurisdictions. The author submits that 
properly conducted comparative research can provide the European Court of Human 
Rights with objective information regarding particular legal matters and offer solutions 
in Europe and worldwide. This paper will explore the way in which the European 
Court of Human Rights conducts its comparative analysis. Comparative analysis often 
proves to be a precondition for the European Court of Human Rights, without which it 
will not rule on the presence or absence of European consensus in a particular area of 
law.  
In the first part of this article, an examination of the purpose of comparative 
analysis in the Court’s case law will be undertaken. It is submitted that, depending on 
the role comparative analysis plays in the particular case, its impact can be identified 
on different levels of the court’s reasoning, namely as background information or 
persuasive argument. If the European Court of Human Rights simply quotes 
comparative data without further examination and does not come to a conclusion about 
the presence or absence of a European consensus, the comparative data serves an 
informative purpose. Comparative data is designed to inform the judges about possible 
solutions to the matter at issue. If the results of the comparative survey affect the 
reasoning of the Court directly, one can conclude that the purpose of this data is 
persuasive. 
Part II focuses on the justification and role of comparative analysis in the 
European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence. In general, commentators perceive 
comparative analysis quite positively. It has been argued, however, that judges of the 
Court can sometimes find themselves in the position of legislating for Europe, as the 
European Convention on Human Rights is a ‘law-making treaty’1 but this ‘law-
making’ cannot be conducted in vacuum and for that reason comparative analysis 
provides valuable guidance for judges. 
Part III is concerned with possible challenges in comparative law. These 
challenges and pitfalls are mostly explored in the context of academic comparative 
analysis. Not all of them are directly applicable to the comparative research conducted 
by the European Court of Human Rights. The ultimate aim of Part III is to describe 
possible challenges and to determine the extent to which these pitfalls are applicable to 
the practice of the Court. Three of the most common problems are examined: cultural 
bias of comparative research, legal terms translation and law ‘cherry picking’. The 
Court is in a better position than many academic institutions to engage in comparative 
research due to the fact that the research is conducted by lawyers from the states in 
question. Moreover, legal systems in Europe, while diverse, are not completely 
incompatible. 
In Part IV, methodology of comparison is outlined. There is no consensus in 
legal scholarship regarding the stages through which every comparative analysis 
should go and the content of these stages. Moreover, comparative research in the 
European Court of Human Rights is different from that which is academic; therefore, 
the stages developed for academic research are not directly applicable to comparative 
law in the Court. This section focuses on two aspects of comparative law in the Court: 
collecting and assessing the data. In circumstances where the comparative analysis 
serves informative purposes, the Court does not assess it; assessment is understood 
here as a consequence of comparative analysis that can affect the final judgment 
directly. It is argued that neither established consensus nor lack of it automatically 
means that the Court will come to a certain conclusion in the case provided by this 
consensus. It establishes a rebuttable presumption that can be overcome by other 
means of interpretation. However, this does not diminish the value of comparative law 
because the reasons for rejection of the consensus argument must be highly 
persuasive. 
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 II. PURPOSES OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
Comparative law and comparative research were originally part of legal theory 
‘not immediately relevant to the daily life of the law’2 they were considered to be 
nothing more than an amusing puzzle.3 However, in the modern globalised world 
which requires everyday interaction between legal systems, application of comparative 
law has become highly relevant in practice. It provides useful data for legislators on a 
domestic level, drafters of international treaties and it can also assist lawyers working 
for international organisations and quasi-judicial institutions in interpreting 
international treaties. Reitz distinguished certain sets of purposes for a comparative 
analysis: 
 
Comparative study of law can be undertaken simply to inform the reader 
about foreign law, perhaps for the practical purpose of facilitating an 
international transaction or resolving a conflict of laws problem. It may be 
part of a campaign of law reform. It may be part of a comparative study of 
human culture or part of a critical project aimed at exposing the way law 
masks the exercise of power. It can even be used to spoof legal 
scholarship.4 
 
The European Court of Human Rights often uses comparative analysis in its 
reasoning. Örücü argues that ‘in developing the law, especially when the law is 
inadequate, or in expending the law, judges may look at foreign jurisdictions to 
achieve uniformity with civilised world’.5 While this idea is more applicable to the 
national judiciary, it is also useful in the case of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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The Court operates in conjunction with national legal orders and should have an 
indication about the way a particular legal matter is normally dealt with in Member 
States. Örücü continues: 
 
As the ECHR frequently uses general and often inconclusively worded 
formulations that necessitate “fleshing out” through interpretation and, as 
many of the rights contain no substantive criteria, judges of the Strasbourg 
court themselves have to become active law-makers. Nevertheless this 
function is not carried out in a vacuum. Comparative reference to the 
growing corpus of human rights law in the international and supranational 
fields likewise represents a persuasive, if not binding source of 
international assistance.6 
 
For that reason, comparative law is no longer simply an amusing puzzle; it 
serves a practical purpose and can affect the final judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Michael O’Boyle, the Deputy Registrar of the Court, argues that if 
there is a ‘crushing’ majority of the Contracting Parties adopting a particular solution, 
it makes this solution very appealing to the judges.7 
Traditionally, scholars have pointed out that comparative law might have 
practical application only in the case of a conflict of laws, for example, in international 
trade.8 In the European Court of Human Rights, comparative law analysis serves two 
main purposes: to inform and to persuade. Judges9 of the Court mentioned these two 
purposes in interviews which the author of this paper conducted; these two purposes 
are also easily identifiable within the text of certain judgments. For instance, in 
Burden v. the United Kingdom,10 the legal matter in question was whether cohabiting 
sisters could be compared with married couples and same-sex partners in civil 
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partnerships for the purposes of inheritance tax. A husband succeeding his wife or a 
wife succeeding her husband, as well as a partner succeeding another partner, is 
exempt from inheritance tax in the United Kingdom. The Court’s judgment included 
Chapter 3 entitled ‘Relevant comparative law and material’; it contained comparative 
analysis of the domestic legislation of some of the Contracting Parties regarding the 
matter at issue. The Court did not identify any commonly accepted standard in the 
area.11 
The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that the legislation in 
respect of inheritance tax is diverse in Europe and confirmed that some Contracting 
Parties might allow tax exemption for siblings. Nevertheless, the Court stated that the 
matter in this case was more related to the legal difference between married couples 
and cohabiting siblings than taxation policy in the Member States: 
 
Just as there can be no analogy between married and Civil Partnership 
Act couples, on one hand, and heterosexual or homosexual couples who 
choose to live together but not to become husband and wife or civil 
partners, on the other hand, the absence of such a legally binding 
agreement between the applicants renders their relationship of co-
habitation, despite its long duration, fundamentally different to that of a 
married or civil partnership couple. This view is unaffected by the fact 
that...Member States have adopted a variety of different rules of 
succession as between survivors of a marriage, civil partnership and 
those in a close family relationship and have similarly adopted different 
policies as regards the grant of inheritance tax exemptions to the 
various categories of survivor; States, in principle, remaining free to 
devise different rules in the field of taxation policy.12 
 
The fact that there is no consensus in Europe regarding the matter at issue did not play 
a decisive role in the Court’s conclusion that there was no violation by the Contracting 
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Party. The Court stated that there is fundamental difference between cohabiting sisters 
and a married couple which cannot be rebutted by an agreement among the 
Contracting Parties; in any event, there is no such agreement. The European Court of 
Human Rights noted that the legislation of Contracting Parties might change but that 
this would not change the legal character of the matter. For that reason, the 
comparative data in this case served only an informative purpose and did not affect the 
final judgment directly. 
Comparative data also served informative purpose in the case K.U. v. 
Finland.13 In this case, the European Court of Human Rights dealt with the issue of 
protection of privacy on the Internet, specifically where an unknown person disclosed 
personal information about the 12-year old applicant on a dating website. The service 
provider, however, refused to divulge the identity of the holder of the IP address in 
question, suggesting that it was bound by the confidentiality of telecommunications as 
defined by law. The applicant complained to the European Court of Human Rights that 
Finland failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.14 The Court 
cited comparative data in its judgment in very general terms: 
 
A comparative review of national legislation of the member States of 
the Council of Europe shows that in most countries there is a specific 
obligation on the part of telecommunications service providers to 
submit computer data, including subscriber information, in response to 
a request by the investigating or judicial authorities, regardless of the 
nature of a crime.15 
 
This information was not referred to in the ratio decidendi of the judgment. 
Despite the fact that the Court mentioned the margin of appreciation of the 
Contracting Party16 and ‘converging standards’ as limits for the margin of 
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appreciation,17 it was articulated in general terms and was not explicitly applied in the 
present case. The Court instead used the principle of effectiveness of rights as an 
interpretive tool in this case.18 While not being dispositive in this case, comparative 
analysis was used to support the findings of the Court which were made by other 
means of interpretation. Mahoney argues that ‘[t]he comparative method in the ECHR 
system serves as an evidentiary accompaniment or supporting factor for other 
interpretative considerations that point to a given meaning’.19 However, it is not the 
only purpose which comparative analysis serves in the European Court of Human 
Rights’ case law. 
In a number of cases, the Court has used comparative data to determine the 
presence or absence of a European consensus or a common trend in respect to a 
particular legal issue. In Unal Tekeli v. Turkey,20 for instance, the European Court of 
Human Rights considered Turkish legislation, which forbade married women from 
retaining their maiden names, in light of the rules accepted by the majority of states. 
Comparative data can be found in this judgment in the chapter dedicated to 
international law. In this case, the Court cited the same wording regarding the margin 
of appreciation and its limits as in K.U. v. Finland but, unlike the latter case, the Court 
in Unal Tekeli conducted more probative assessment of the issue. It stated that: 
 
[T]he Court notes the emergence of a consensus among the Contracting 
States of the Council of Europe in favour of choosing the spouses’ 
family name on an equal footing. Of the member states of the Council 
of Europe Turkey is the only country which legally imposes – even 
where the couple prefers an alternative arrangement – the husband’s 
name as the couple’s surname and thus the automatic loss of the 
woman’s own surname on her marriage.21 
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Moreover, the Court cited common European practice as a counterargument to 
the Government’s submission that the legal position in Turkish legislation was 
justified by the necessity of ‘reflecting family unity through a joint family name’.22 In 
contrast to the above mentioned Burden v. the United Kingdom and K.U. v Finland 
cases, the European Court of Human Rights explicitly articulated the place of 
comparative analysis in its reasoning: the Court analyzed the state of European 
legislation and concluded that a European consensus existed. Comparative analysis is 
an important precondition for the determination of the presence and absence of 
consensus. If the Court comes to this conclusion, comparative analysis can be said to 
be have persuasive value in the Court’s reasoning. 
 
III. ROLE AND JUSTIFICATION OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH 
 
As mentioned above, comparative law can enable the European Court of 
Human Rights to rule on the presence or absence of consensus on a particular matter, 
but the value of comparative law is not limited to this. Comparative law can serve as a 
source of information for judges in the search for an appropriate answer to a given 
question.  
The legitimacy of recourse to comparative law is addressed by Mahoney as 
follows:  
 
The mission of the Strasbourg Court often involves ruling on the 
compatibility of the laws and practices of a contracting State with the 
requirements of the ECHR. It might therefore be asked whether, in 
order to accomplish that mission of international judicial control, it is at 
all legitimate to rely on a comparative reference back to national 
legislation.23 
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Mahoney answers this question positively and argued that the European Court 
of Human Rights often faces situations in which the legal solution does not clearly 
follow from the Convention and judges find themselves in the position of legislators. 
However, judicial law-making cannot be conducted in vacuum. He emphasised the 
subsidiary role of the Court to national legal systems and this, in his opinion, justifies 
references to the law of Contracting Parties.24 Örücü went even further and argued that 
‘[c]omparativism is inherent in the ECHR system of protection’.25 According to 
Örücü, ‘[c]omparativism [is] much at the heart of human rights cases, if human rights 
are to be regarded as embodying principles that are universal rather that purely 
domestic or even European.’26 Indeed, she goes on to note that ‘[i]t is true that most of 
the time reference to other jurisdictions gives broader legitimacy to judicial decisions 
in human rights cases’.27 
While quite positive about comparative law in the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights, commentators emphasise different aspects of its role. On the 
one hand, Delmas-Marty argues that comparative law is a tool that might restrict 
judicial arbitrariness and therefore legitimises a court’s judgment. She maintains that 
judicial arbitrariness cannot be avoided by procedural rules alone; substantive rules, 
which comparative law can help to define, bring more confidence in judicial creativity 
in the European Court of Human Rights.28 Judges might take a more active position if 
this position is supported by generally adopted practices of the majority of Contracting 
Parties, while remaining reluctant to ‘rewrite the Convention to help an individual.’29 
Barak contends that if the judge has comparative law to support him, he is 
more certain that he is standing on safe ground. The European Court of Human Rights 
does not seem willing to prohibit the use of comparative analysis in its reasoning; on 
the contrary, recent developments show a more scientific approach to comparative 
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law. The Court now has a research department which is designed to undertake 
comparative analysis following the request of the Judge Rapporteur. 
There are objective reasons why both national courts and international tribunals 
use comparative law in their reasoning. Koopmans argues that comparative legal 
analysis is used more widely by the courts as a result of new social problems which 
emerged and legislators who are not in a position to cope with these matters 
sufficiently.30 This is also relevant in the case of international tribunals like the 
European Court of Human Rights. Negotiations regarding new protocols are extremely 
lengthy and complicated. New protocols must be adopted by all forty seven 
Contracting Parties and the Court often cannot wait until formal agreement from the 
Contracting Parties has been secured. 
Mahoney notes that one exaggerates when stating that the European Court of 
Human Rights uses ‘comparative analysis.’31 Indeed, comparative data, if cited by the 
Court, is often far from comprehensive. Some commentators argue that the Court uses 
the argument of European consensus without reference to any comparative research. In 
the well-known Tyrer case32 the Court did not cite any comparative data but came to 
the conclusion that there was European accord with respect to corporal punishment. 
However, since Tyrer, the European Court of Human Rights has developed from a 
body which sits in sessions and considers 4 to 5 cases a year to a permanent court 
which considers more than one thousand cases per annum.33 The workload of the 
Court has increased substantively and at the same time, the importance of its 
judgments has risen significantly. The quality of judgment is extremely important for 
the authority and legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights. For this reason, 
the Court conducts comprehensive and reliable comparative research that can support 
its findings. After the Research Department was included in the Court’s Registry, it 
appeared to be fully equipped to undertake such high quality research. 
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 IV. CHALLENGES OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
 
Regardless of whether comparative data serves an informative or persuasive 
purpose, it should be objective and adequate. There are a number of possible 
challenges that a tribunal involved in comparative analysis can face. These challenges 
will be examined to determine the extent to which they are relevant to the comparative 
research undertaken by the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
IV.I Bias and Cultural Determinacy of Comparative Analysis 
 
Many scholars have referred to a bias-based argument in their research of 
comparative law methods.34 The main thesis of this argument is based on the cultural 
and social determinacy of comparative research. Scholarship, it is contended, is 
predominantly ‘western-dominated and western-biased.’35 This threatens comparative 
research in the practical dimension of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisprudence, which must be as objective as possible. Bias in comparative research is 
not as significant a problem in Europe as it is on an international level due to the more 
diverse nature of laws worldwide. Democratic values should be respected by the 
Member States of the Council of Europe and accepted by virtue of entry to the 
Convention. This idea is reflected in the Convention’s Preamble, which states that ‘the 
governments of European countries...are like-minded and have a common heritage of 
political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’. However, it is widely 
accepted that Europe is still diverse, both legally and culturally. Some commentators, 
for instance, argue that ‘individual freedom had and still has rather different meaning 
in Russia or China compared to the Western view, not just because of a communist 
ideology currently or formerly imposed by the rulers in those countries, but because of 
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a more basic, culturally embedded ideology which starts from a very different, 
collectivist world view.’36 
A number of the Contracting Parties to the Convention were communist states 
not more than 20 years ago. Comparativists quite frequently do not take cultural 
diversity of this kind into account. Cultural determinacy of adequate comparative 
research is highlighted by a number of scholars. According to their collective view, 
law is more than just a sum of legal provisions.37 Mahoney argues that ‘national rules 
cannot simply be compared in isolation but have above all to be understood in their 
local context, in relation to the national legal system concerned and their operation in 
practice – should prevent its being given any such determinative effect.’38 Moreover, 
certain extra-legal factors such as customs and legal practices should be taken into 
consideration.39 In some countries, the law as expressed in textbooks is quite different 
to the law under which people live.40 The same legal norm might have completely 
different effects in different legal systems precisely because legal practice is different. 
The European Court of Human Rights takes this notion into account. In Tanase and 
Chirtoaca v. Moldova, the Court explored Member States’ legislation regarding dual 
citizenship. The Court stated ‘[i]n some of the countries which ban double nationality, 
in practice the provisions aimed at preventing multiple nationalities have remained a 
dead letter (for instance Estonia).’41 Hoecke and Warrington argue that if the cultural 
parameters are not taken into account one might find much more similarities that there 
are in reality.42 
For these reasons, a number of comparativists argue that norm-centred 
comparison does not provide adequate results.43 Stone argues that in order to complete 
an objective comparative survey ‘[w]e must study the history, the politics, the 
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economics, the cultural background in literature and the arts, the religion, beliefs and 
practices, the philosophies, if we are to reach sound conclusions as to what is and what 
is not common’.44 This idealistic approach was criticised by Cruz as impractical, 
because it is hardly possible to be a specialist in all these areas and it is not always 
necessary to consider such detail45. 
The European Court of Human Rights might find itself in a more advantageous 
position than most involved in an academic comparative research. Comparative 
research is conducted by the Research Unit, a department within the Court’s Registry. 
Lawyers from this department send requests to national lawyers working within the 
Registry commissioning a report on the way in which a particular legal matter is dealt 
with by their national legislation; this report, once confirmed by a national judge, 
should be submitted to the Research Unit. Therefore, the reports are prepared by the 
lawyers from their home countries who are familiar with the real social effect that 
particular norms have. Moreover, despite the diversity in Europe, comparativists in the 
European Court of Human Rights are still in a better position than those who compare 
laws globally because some legal systems worldwide are simply incompatible.  
It is important to note that the comparative analysis conducted by the European 
Court of Human Rights is not aimed at explaining the differences or commonalities 
between different legal systems, which is often the case with academic comparative 
research. Kamba states that: 
 
A systematic comparison which is the essence of comparative law, 
seeks to explain the similarities and divergences between the legal 
systems selected for comparison. The reasons for these differences and 
similarities are very often extra-legal and cannot be causally linked to 
any legal rule or principle.46 
 
In the European Court of Human Rights, comparative analysis has a more 
descriptive and less analytical character. The Research Department provides a 
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description of the ways in which a particular legal matter is regulated in Member 
States and does not attempt to explain the differences and similarities. In Layla Sahin 
v. Turkey, the Court included the results of comparative law in the judgment without 
making any attempts to analyse the reasons behind them; the Court was more 
interested in the results themselves.47 For that reason, cultural determinacy can affect 
comparative law only if the legal practice is substantively different to the legal norms 
in place and is not documented by the national lawyer who prepares the report. In 
other cases, the Court is mainly concerned with the legal regulations of a particular 
legal matter. 
 
IV.II Legal Terms Translation 
 
An alternative challenge that the European Court of Human Rights faces in 
conducting comparative analysis concerns the translation of legal terms. This problem 
is linked to the one described above but is more technical and perhaps more relevant to 
the practice of the Court. 
The same terms can describe different legal phenomena in different legal 
systems. Kamba notes that ‘[t]he term possession, for example, has a juridical 
meaning in French law different from that under English law’.48 In some cases, the 
European Court of Human Rights is forced to compare similar legal concepts that do 
not match exactly. In J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the 
United Kingdom, the Court stated that: 
 
[i]t is plain from the comparative material submitted by the parties that 
a large number of member States possesses some form of mechanism 
for transferring title in accordance with principles similar to adverse 
possession in the common law systems, and that such transfer is 
effected without the payment of compensation to the original owner.49 
                                                            
47
 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey (App no 44774/98) [2004] ECHR 299, 55-65. 
48
 Kamba (n 3) 222. 
49
 J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v. the United Kingdom (App no 44302/02) 
]2005] Unpublished, 72. 
 The Court was not in a position to compare procedures that were exactly the 
same as those in the case at hand; however, it seems to have compared legal 
procedures with different degrees of similarity. Reitz argues that this comparative 
analysis is in some sense comparing apples and oranges.50 However, it can be relevant 
as it may bring the Court closer to a conclusion on the appropriateness of a solution 
adopted by the State in question. 
Some commentators have argued that ‘even in English speaking countries, 
homonyms may have different meanings. Hence, if the basic legal concepts are 
similar, different terms may be utilised so as to create an impression of divergence, 
and this may even occur within the same legal family.’51 It is even more problematic if 
legal terms are compared with those from non-English-speaking countries. Kamba 
argues that ‘[a]n examination of the formal or textual legal norms, institutions and 
concepts in one system may not disclose corresponding categories in another system. 
This is particularly so where systems are rooted in completely different social types’.52 
Again, this is partly rectified in the European Court of Human Rights’ context, in that 
initial reports are submitted by the lawyers who speak the language of the Member 
State in question as their first language and English and/or French fluently. Moreover, 
the legal systems within the Council of Europe are not as diverse as legal systems 
internationally. 
Reitz argues that good comparative analysis should describe the degree to 
which there are equivalents in the national systems of the Member States.53 The 
European Court of Human Rights has taken a number of important differences into 
account.. In the Shofman v. Russia54, for instance, the Court used comparative law to 
determine whether there was a commonly accepted standard in respect of time-limits 
for bringing proceedings contesting paternity. The Court came to the conclusion that 
there was no uniform standard. However, it was not enough to compare the periods of 
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time which different legal systems leave for this kind of legal action: it was also 
important to compare the point at which these terms begin. 
 
[T]he difference between the various legal systems that is relevant to 
the present case is not only the length of the limitation period as such, 
but also its dies a quo. In some States the period is calculated from the 
moment the putative father knew or should have known that he had 
been registered as the child’s father. The other States, which are 
approximately equal in number, accept as the starting point the date he 
learnt or should have learnt of circumstances casting doubt on the 
child’s legitimacy. Many States in the latter category have introduced a 
second time-limit, making it possible to disclaim paternity only when 
the child is still young. A few States in which time starts to run from the 
child’s birth, irrespective of the father’s awareness of any other facts, 
also fall into the latter category.55 
 
Therefore, the same numerical periods of time might lead to completely 
different outcomes for the claimant if it begins from the moment of a child’s birth or 
from the moment of the father’s awareness of the circumstances. This is an obvious 
example; sometimes these differences are hidden from researchers and can only be 
identified through examination of legal practice adopted in the particular state. 
Comparative analysis by the European Court of Human Rights seems to be more 
adequate and consistent when it considers norms in their context rather than purely as 
legal provisions enshrined in the legislation.  
International courts face problems of translation on a regular basis. Judges 
approach the matters at issue from the perspective of their national legal and cultural 
backgrounds. Cruz argues that: 
  
[b]y virtue of their legal background and origins, judges of the ECJ are 
bound to draw upon their own experience as lawyers within the member 
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States. The Court seeks to evaluate and possibly utilise solutions 
provided by the legal systems from which the judges are drawn.56 
 
The same principle is applicable to the judges of the European Court of Human 
Rights; they perceive different legal matters from the point of view of their national 
legal system and terminology.  
The issue of term translation is common for all international tribunals dealing 
with different legal systems. It is relevant even where legal systems operate in the 
same language, with differing languages making term translation all the more 
complicated. For comparative research to be adequate, the European Court of Human 
Rights must take the context in which the norm is operating into account. Legal term 
translation is a matter which is engaged in every case; judges should be able to find a 
functionally equivalent term in their native languages and in English and/or French. 
This process can be called unavoidable or natural comparison. 
 
IV.III Law Cherry Picking 
 
Another important methodological challenge is that of a ‘choice of laws’. The 
results of comparative research might be different if the researcher selects a slightly 
different list of states under consideration.57 McCrudden expresses his concerns of 
substantial cherry picking when selecting which legislation to quote. He argues that 
courts are more likely to quote foreign judgment or include comparative materials in 
cases where they support their own convictions. This can lead to arbitrariness and 
illegitimate judging.58 
Örücü also voices concerns regarding consistency in the use of foreign law by 
national and international courts, arguing that: 
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the use of foreign cases is selective and there is no scientific approach 
to the choice. Neither is a specific methodology applied. In addition, the 
choice to use foreign judicial decisions remains largely in the realm of 
judicial discretion, and the exercise of this discretion may be related to 
many factors.59  
 
The choice of laws is a very important part of the comparative research process 
because the European Court of Human Rights is not in a position to explore the 
legislation of all forty seven Member States. In this situation, the choice of law might 
affect the results of the research. Therefore, it is very important that the Court makes it 
clear in its judgment which laws were compared. In a number of cases the Court did 
not mention the countries or legislation under consideration. In K.U. v. Finland, the 
Court mentioned that ‘[a] comparative review of national legislation of the member 
States of the Council of Europe shows that in most countries there is a specific 
obligation on the part of telecommunications service providers to submit computer 
data…’.60 The Court did not consider it necessary to list Member States and their 
particular legal provisions. It is certainly not possible to quote all relevant laws lest 
this overburden the judgment; however, comparative research should be transparent 
and accessible for the general public. Anything less than this leaves a judgment less 
convincing.  
The judgment in question seems to be more justified if certain assumptions are 
proved correct by references to comparative research, with clear indications of the 
laws being examined. Lack of transparency leads to: the inability of parties to foresee 
the Court’s findings; frustration amongst the general public and commentators, as 
established consensus can influence the law of the Member States, and; an inability to 
examine the judgments of the Court in terms of accuracy of the comparative research. 
The last point is crucial because comparative analysis might retain important 
persuasive authority in some cases.  
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The European Court of Human Rights should adopt certain recommendations 
regarding the number of laws to be examined in a particular case. Comparativists 
allow reasonable limitation of the volume of legislation under examination if it is done 
‘without defeating the purpose of the comparison.’61 In every particular case, a lawyer 
in the Research Unit chooses the Member States whose legislation will then be 
considered. This choice should vary in accordance with the specific purpose of the 
research. The following recommendations might be seen as useful starting points for 
such research.  
Firstly, the legislations of the States which belong to the same legal family as 
that in question should be examined, for instance, if the United Kingdom is a 
respondent State Irish law should be examined as well because both legal systems 
belong to common law. The rationale behind this proposal is derived from the idea 
that the most valuable and adequate comparison can be conducted between two or 
more legal systems with similar cultural and legal background62. ‘[I]n order to make 
meaningful comparisons, it is important to select systems that are at similar stage in 
their legal (and often their political, economic and social) evolution’.63 Secondly, if the 
ECtHR has information that one of the Member States has recently changed its 
legislation in respect to the subject this law can be used to see the most up-to-date 
trends. Finally, the legislation of at least one Member State from each geographical 
regions of Europe should be examined; the ECtHR’s section division might be useful 
in this respect, namely the law from at least one State from each of the sections should 
be under consideration. The main purpose of comparative research in a number of 
cases is find out whether there is European consensus in the area under consideration 
or not. The ECtHR can establish European consensus or European trend only in a 
situation if different European legal systems are considered. European consensus 
means lack of substantial disagreements in the area not only among the countries with 
similar legal systems but among the majority of the Member States. If the ECtHR 
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follows these recommendations then the choice of law is going to be more consistent 
and representative. 
 
V. THE PROCESS OF COMPARISON 
 
V.I  Collection of Comparative Data 
 
Selecting a method of comparative research is one of the great challenges in 
comparative law.64 A large body of literature has been written in an attempt to shed 
light on the issue of comparative methodology. Nevertheless, Zweigert and Kolz argue 
that there is ‘very little systematic writing about the method of comparative law.’65 It 
may be beneficial to distinguish between comparative research conducted by 
academics and comparative research by lawyers on behalf of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The latter should be less advanced because academic comparison 
focuses on examining not only law itself, but also the reasons for the emergence of this 
law which are often irrelevant for Court’s purposes. This simplified process should not 
affect the objectiveness of the findings and should serve practical purposes, providing 
the Court with information about possible solutions to the legal question at issue and 
leading to a conclusion regarding the presence or absence of European consensus if 
necessary. The research should not resolve fundamental legal problems (academic 
comparison may be designed to serve this aim), but rather should indicate whether 
there is a European trend in a particular area.  
The process of comparison consists of a number of stages. There is no 
consensus in legal scholarship regarding the number of these stages or their content. 
An important procedural difference between academic comparative analysis and 
comparative research in the European Court of Human Rights is that, in the latter case, 
different stages of research are undertaken by different actors, namely, collection of 
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data is conducted by lawyers of the Court and analysis of this data is completed by 
judges. 
Kamba suggests that there are three main stages of comparative research, 
namely the descriptive, identification and explanatory phases.66 At the first stage, the 
researcher explores and explains the legal provisions in a particular area of law. At the 
second stage, commonalities and differences between these legal provisions are 
identified. At the last stage, ‘an attempt will be made to account for the resemblances 
and dissimilarities between systems, concepts or institutions’.67 
Cruz outlined more detailed eight steps process of comparison. Firstly, identify the 
problem and state it as precisely as possible. Secondly, identify the foreign jurisdiction 
and, if possible, the parent legal family to which it belongs. Thirdly, decide which 
primary sources of law are going to be needed or which materials are available? 
Fourthly, gather and assemble the material relevant to the jurisdiction being examined. 
Fifthly, organise the material in accordance with headings reflecting the legal 
philosophy and ideology of the legal system being investigated. Sixthly, provisionally 
map out the possible answers to the problem, comparing carefully the different 
approaches, bearing in mind possible cultural differences or socio-economic factors, 
where relevant, and exploring any other non-legal factors. Seventhly, critically analyse 
the legal principles in terms of their intrinsic meaning. Lastly, set out your conclusions 
within a comparative framework with caveats and with critical commentary, wherever 
relevant, and relate it to the original purpose of your enquiry.68 
The lawyers of the European Court of Human Rights involved in comparative 
analysis also go through these stages. However, the specific character of the Court as 
an international tribunal adds certain particular features to the comparative process 
conducted within the Court. They can be summarised as follows. Firstly, different 
stages are conducted by different lawyers. Secondly, materials and information is 
gathered by national lawyers and verified by the judges from the State at hand. 
Thirdly, there is a special unit within the Court that coordinate the comparative 
analysis. Fourthly, the judges are involved in comparative research only at two last 
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stages according to the Cruz’s classification. Lastly, the ECtHR does not usually 
compare legal principles but solutions to particular legal problems, for example, 
regulation of adverse possession (J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land 
Ltd v. the United Kingdom), legal obligations of internet hosting providers (K.U. v. 
Finland), approaches to religious symbols in schools and universities (Leyla Sahin v. 
Turkey) and others. 
At the European Court of Human Rights, there is a stage which precedes the 
first stage referred to by both Kamba and Cruz whereby the judge decides whether a 
particular case requires comparative law analysis. The Court is not in a position to 
conduct comparative research in all cases and moreover, this would not be necessary 
for a number of reasons, the most important of which is that, in most cases, the Court 
deals with legal issues that are similar to ones on which it has already adjudicated 
(clone cases). Judge Rapporteurs usually request comparative research in cases which 
involve complicated legal issues and where the issue falls in a legal area which is new 
for the Court or tests the limits of the its jurisdiction. 
According to Cruz, the first stage of comparative analysis is problem 
identification. In the European Court of Human Rights, this stage is not always 
straightforward. In most cases the problem flows directly from the subject matter of 
the case itself. However, there are cases where the subject matter can be interpreted 
differently by different judges of the Court. In Leyla Sahin, the subject matter of the 
comparison formed the substance of a dissenting opinion. In that case the Court 
examined a Turkish ban on religious symbols in universities and tested its compliance 
with the Convention. The majority came to the conclusion that the State should be 
granted a wide margin of appreciation based on the diversity of practice within the 
Contracting Parties.69 Judge Tulkens (dissenting) stated: 
 
I would perhaps have been able to follow the margin-of-appreciation 
approach had two factors not drastically reduced its relevance in the 
instant case. The first concerns the argument the majority use to justify 
the width of the margin, namely the diversity of practice between the 
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States on the issue of regulating the wearing of religious symbols in 
educational institutions and, thus, the lack of a European consensus in 
this sphere. The comparative-law materials do not allow of such a 
conclusion, as in none of the member States has the ban on wearing 
religious symbols extended to university education, which is intended 
for young adults, who are less amenable to pressure.70 
 
Concurring with this dissenting opinion, some commentators argue that the 
subject of comparison was chosen arbitrarily.71 In order to make comparative data 
relevant to the matter at hand, the subject of the comparative analysis should be 
carefully and precisely articulated.  
Steps two to five are conducted by the lawyers of the Court under the 
supervision of national judges and lawyers of the Research Unit in the Registry. The 
most important issue during these steps is to provide the Chamber or Grand Chamber 
with consistent and reliable comparative data which can be assessed by the judges 
during the preparation of their judgment. It is important to specify the list of the states 
whose law will be examined, and functionally equivalent terms and legal concepts 
should be analysed. The challenges associated with this exercise were outlined in the 
previous section. Data collected and systemised during steps two to five will be 
assessed and analysed at steps seven and eight.  
As one may notice from the classifications expounded by Cruz, academic 
comparative research does not end with identification of differences or similarities 
regarding treatment of a particular legal issue. The same idea was advocated by 
Kamba: ‘the systematic comparison entails…also the explanation of such divergences 
and resemblances’.72 Comparison within the European Court of Human Rights’ 
jurisdiction serves two purposes, namely informative and persuasive. If the Court 
views the comparative data simply as a source of inspiration and information, judges 
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go no further in their analysis. If the Court is aiming to establish the presence or 
absence of European consensus, analysis of comparative data is an important stage. 
The same comparative data can lead different judges to mutually exclusive 
conclusions.73 In the case Odievre v. France,74 the European Court of Human Rights 
assessed compliance with the European Convention of a provision in French law that 
gives a woman the right to give birth anonymously and to ensure that the child will not 
be entitled to any information about his or her mother. The Court analysed the 
legislation of Contracting Parties on this matter and concluded that: 
 
...most of the Contracting States do not have legislation that is 
comparable to that applicable in France, at least as regards the child's 
permanent inability to establish parental ties with the natural mother if 
she continues to keep her identity secret from the child she has brought 
into the world. However, it notes that some countries do not impose a 
duty on natural parents to declare their identities on the birth of their 
children and that there have been cases of child abandonment in various 
other countries that have given rise to renewed debate about the right to 
give birth anonymously. In the light not only of the diversity of practice 
to be found among the legal systems and traditions but also of the fact 
that various means are being resorted to for abandoning children, the 
Court concludes that States must be afforded a margin of appreciation 
to decide which measures are apt to ensure that the rights guaranteed by 
the Convention are secured to everyone within their jurisdiction.75 
 
This argument was challenged by the dissenting Judges Wildhaber, Sir Nicolas 
Bratza, Bonello, Loucaides, Cabral Barreto, Tulkens and Pellonpää. They argued that 
the majority was in a position to pronounce on the lack of European consensus but that 
they failed to consider ‘various international instruments that play a decisive role in 
achieving a consensus and which seek to ensure a balance between competing rights in 
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individual cases’.76 In Marckx v. Belgium,77 the Court based its decision regarding the 
presence or absence of European consensus on the relevant international treaty on 
whether in the Court had been reluctant to do so in the Odievre case. The European 
Court of Human Rights seems to lack consistency with regard to the type of consensus 
it is ready to find: it can be identified through the analysis of municipal legislation78, 
international treaties ratified by all or some of the Contracting Parties79 or some sort of 
combination of these two sources with more emphasis on either municipal or 
international legislation.80 Within this framework, the judgments of the Court seem 
inconsistent and unpredictable; at times it has been satisfied with consensus on an 
international level (D.H v. Czech Republic81) while at others, it has held that 
international law is not concrete enough (Chapman v. the United Kingdom82). It is 
hard to measure the ‘concreteness’ of consensus and the Court was not in a position to 
provide even an approximate scale for this measurement. The Court is expected to 
explain when an international treaty is sufficient to constitute European consensus, 
whether this treaty should be binding or not and whether it should be implemented into 
domestic legislation. 
 
V.II Assessment of Comparative Data 
 
If the European Court of Human Rights identifies a consensus, it does not 
follow that a particular solution must be adopted automatically. In certain 
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circumstances, the minority position does not indicate that a Convention right has been 
violated by the Member State. 
Comparative research can lead the European Court of Human Rights to three 
possible conclusions. First, the Court is in a position to claim that European consensus 
exists in the area and the law in question constitutes a part of this. In Stoll v. 
Switzerland83 the applicant argued that the State had breached its Convention 
obligation under Article 10 by imposing a criminal sanction for disclosure of 
confidential information. The Court noted that ‘a consensus appears to exist among the 
Member States of the Council of Europe on the need for appropriate criminal 
sanctions to prevent the disclosure of certain confidential items of information’.84 
However, a situation in which the Court upholds that the legislation at issue constitutes 
part of European consensus is quite rare. One might find few cases where the Court 
reached this conclusion. Moreover, even if the Court admits that the law is within 
European consensus, it does not halt its analysis at this point, it continues to consider 
the more particular issues of the case, for instance, whether the particular measures are 
proportionate to the pursued aim. In the above mentioned case of Stoll v. Switzerland, 
for example, the Court, after stating that the Swiss law was similar to the laws in the 
majority of European States, also considered whether the fine for the disclosure of 
information was proportionate or not. The reason for that is, arguably, linked to the 
purpose of the European consensus argument. The judges of the European Court of 
Human Rights, when interviewed, confirmed that they mostly require consensus and 
comparative analysis in situations where they are on the ‘new ground’.85 New grounds 
are understood to be legal matters that can arguably be governed by the European 
Convention but comprise issues on which the Court has not yet ruled.  
The position of municipal law as a part of European consensus does not 
guarantee that the European Court of Human Rights will find no violation of the 
Convention. In B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, the complaint concerned the inability 
of a former father-in-law to marry his former daughter-in-law according to British law. 
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The Court concluded that a prohibition similar to the British one could be found in the 
laws of a large number of the Contracting Parties86. Nevertheless the Court further 
stated that: 
 
The Court must however examine the facts of the case in the context 
pertaining in the United Kingdom. It observes that this bar on marriage 
is aimed at protecting the integrity of the family (preventing sexual 
rivalry between parents and children) and preventing harm to children 
who may be affected by the changing relationships of the adults around 
them. These are, without doubt, legitimate aims. [However, u]nder 
United Kingdom law the bar on a marriage of this degree of affinity is 
not subject to an absolute prohibition. Marriages can take place, 
pursuant to a personal Act of Parliament. From the information before 
the Court, it transpires that individuals in a similar situation to these 
applicants have been permitted to marry..., where there were also 
children in the household, it was declared that the impediment placed 
on the marriage served no useful purpose of public policy. The 
inconsistency between the stated aims of the incapacity and the waiver 
applied in some cases undermines the rationality and logic of the 
measure.87 
 
The European Court of Human Rights held that Article 12 of the Convention 
had been violated in this case. While the Court is not obliged to follow European 
consensus, ‘the circumstances would have to be highly exceptional for the European 
Court to declare a common practice or legislative policy of the Contracting States to 
be contrary to the Convention’.88 In B. and L. v. the UK the Court did not deem the 
law in question to be a violation of the Convention but it is submitted that the 
circumstances of the case make it impossible for the Court to follow common practice.  
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In certain cases the European Court of Human Rights did not find breaches of 
the Convention because the State in question was not the only one of its kind which 
implemented the infringing legal provisions. In Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia,89 
the Court dealt with the compliance of the Georgian system of the voters’ registration 
with the European Convention. The Court stated that: 
 
...it must be noted that the respondent State was not alone in opting for 
such a system of voter registration: several Western European 
democracies, in particular the United Kingdom and Portugal, also rely 
to a considerable extent on voters' individual declarations when 
compiling the national electoral rolls; Portuguese law even envisages 
individual criminal responsibility for those who evade taking the 
necessary steps for electoral registration. Thus, there can be a diversity 
of possible choices in the system of voter registration amongst the 
Contracting States. None of these criteria should, however, be 
considered more valid than any other, provided that the expression of 
the will of the people through free, fair and regular elections is 
guaranteed.90 
 
In finding that the legislation is not unique among Contracting Parties, the 
European Court of Human Rights acknowledges that there is no consensus and no 
uniform approach in the particular area. In the recent case of Egeland and Hanseid v. 
Norway,91 the Court also used the above formula: 
 
It is to be noted that Norway is not in an isolated position with regard to 
prohibition to photograph charged or convicted persons in connection 
with court proceedings. According to information available to the 
Court, similar prohibitions exist in the domestic laws of Cyprus, 
England and Wales, and legal restrictions apply also in Austria and 
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Denmark. Whilst in a number of countries such matters are left to self-
regulation by the press, it cannot be said that there is a European 
consensus to this effect.92 
 
Here the Court referred to ‘European consensus up-side-down’, stating that it can 
identify a violation if the law in question cannot be found in any other legal system in 
Europe. Therefore, the Court allows a wide margin of appreciation unless only one 
country remains outside the common trend.  
Secondly, the European Court of Human Rights can reach the conclusion that 
there is no European consensus regarding the issue in question. In this situation the 
Court normally confirms that the issue falls within the state’s margin of appreciation. 
In Evans v. the United Kingdom the Court stated ‘[w]here... there is no consensus 
within the Member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative 
importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly 
where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider’.93 A 
wide margin of appreciation means that the Court will not find the law or practice of 
the Member State to be in breach of the Convention if this matter falls under the 
discretion of the Member State and that ‘the Court would generally respect the 
legislature's policy choice unless it is manifestly without reasonable foundation’.94 
The European Court of Human Rights did not provide a definition of what it 
considers to be an intervention which is ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation.’ In 
TV Vest As & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, the Court dealt with a prohibition 
on television broadcasting of political advertising laid down in the Broadcasting Act 
enacted in Norway. The Court confirmed that there was no European consensus in the 
area and that quite a wide margin of appreciation is granted to Member States.95 
However, the Court took into account the special circumstances of this case and found 
a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court noted that the legislation in 
question was aimed to remove disadvantages between political parties that have 
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different financial resources, namely, that the parties with small budgets would 
otherwise be underrepresented on television. However, the Court continued that the 
law in question failed to achieve this aim. In contrast to the major political parties, 
which were given a large amount of attention in the edited television coverage, the 
small parties were hardly mentioned. Therefore, paid advertising on television became 
the only way for these parties to get their message across to the public through that 
type of media.96  
In Hirst v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights dealt 
with a legal provision according to which convicted prisoners would be deprived the 
right to vote. The Court conducted comparative analysis in this case and while it 
agreed that there was no European consensus, stated that this lack of consensus cannot 
be decisive in this case.97 The Court held that: 
 
while the Court reiterates that the margin of appreciation is wide, it is 
not all-embracing. The [relevant] provision imposes a blanket 
restriction on all convicted prisoners in prison. It applies automatically 
to such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence and 
irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual 
circumstances. Such a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction 
on a vitally important Convention right must be seen as falling outside 
any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that margin might 
be, and as being incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.98 
 
These two cases can be compared with the case Appleby and Others v. the 
United Kingdom, which concerned an alleged violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The applicants began collecting signatures for a petition to persuade the 
council to reject a project to rebuild the public playing field. They tried to set up a stall 
and canvass views in ‘The Galleries’, a shopping mall in Washington that had become 
the effective town centre. They were prevented from doing so, however, by Postel, a 
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private company which had bought most of the shopping area and had, under domestic 
law, the power to exclude anyone conducting unauthorised activities on its land.99 The 
applicants brought their claim that the State did not fulfill its positive obligation under 
article 10 of the Convention to the European Court of Human Rights. The Court failed 
to find any uniformity in legal regulation of this matter in Europe and stated that ‘[i]t 
cannot be said that there is as yet any emerging consensus that could assist the Court 
in its examination in this case concerning Article 10 of the Convention’.100 The same 
court had come to the opposite conclusion to that which it had delivered in the TV Vest 
As & Rogaland Pensjonistparti case. The Court held in this case that the State did not 
breach article 10.  
Lack of consensus does not automatically leave the issue within the area of the 
state’s discretion. The European Court of Human Rights can further examine the law 
to determine whether it is manifestly unreasonable and appropriate to leave the matter 
to the state’s discretion. European consensus or lack of it establishes a rebuttable 
presumption which can be overcome with convincing reasons brought by other means 
of interpretation.  
A third situation emerges where the State’s legislation opposes European 
consensus. In the above mentioned case Unal Tekeli v. Turkey, Turkey appeared to be 
the last state in Europe where it was illegal for a woman to remain with her maiden 
surname after she married.101 The Court held that this law violated Article 14 when 
taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. However, this is not the only 
possible outcome for the State if it finds itself outside European legal trend. The 
following outcomes might occur. Firslty, the Member State’s law falls outside 
European consensus and there is no reasonable justification for that as in the 
mentioned above Unal Tekeli v. Turkey case. Secondly, the Member State has a 
particularly strong justification for having the law in question even if this law is 
different to common European trend. Lastly, the law in question can be outside 
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European consensus if it provides even further protection of human rights than in the 
majority of the Member States. 
In the first option the consequences are quite clear: the Court normally holds a 
violation of the Convention right. In the second situation the result is not so obvious. 
The state may try to justify its position with social, economic and cultural reasons. 
Brems argues that European consensus establishes a rebuttable presumption that 
should be followed unless there is moral justification to the contrary.102 In the above 
mentioned case of Leyle Sahin v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights 
assessed the compliance of the Turkish legal prohibition on wearing the Islamic 
headscarf in universities to the Convention. The Court conducted comparative 
research and noted that certain European countries had placed a ban on wearing 
religious signs at school. However, only Azerbaijan, Turkey and Albania had 
introduced regulations on wearing the Islamic headscarf in universities.103 
Nevertheless the Court argued that there is no uniform approach towards regulation of 
this issue in educational establishments. The Court pointed out that there is ‘diversity 
of the approaches taken by national authorities on the issue’.104  
It seems that the European Court of Human Rights chose to distinguish legal 
regulations on wearing religious signs at school from wearing such signs in university. 
University students need much less paternalistic treatment by the state than pupils at 
school. This point was emphasised by Judge Tulkens in her dissenting opinion. She 
stated that ‘[t]he comparative-law materials do not allow of such a conclusion [of lack 
of European consensus], as in none of the member States has the ban on wearing 
religious symbols extended to university education, which is intended for young 
adults, who are less amenable to pressure’.105 
In this case it seems appropriate to take the special cultural and social 
circumstances of Turkey into account rather than attempt to find consensus in respect 
to the issue. Some commentators argue that the case must be read in the specific 
political, cultural, and religious context.  
                                                            
102
 E Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Hague 2001), 
420. 
103
 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey (n 47) 55-65. 
104
 ibid 109. 
105
 ibid. Dissenting opinion. Judge Tulkens. 
 It might be contended that it is the international nature of the Sahin 
judgment that explains it... The especial political sensitivity of Turkey's 
situation, on the borders of Syria, Iraq and Iran and facing the real 
threat from within of extreme Islamist political parties gaining power 
and seeking ‘to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols 
and conception of a society founded on religious precepts’ may help 
explain the judgment.106 
 
Therefore, the situation in Turkey is quite unique and can hardly be compared 
with the majority of other European States. For that particular reason the European 
consensus argument seems less relevant and can be rebutted by the specific political, 
cultural, and social context of Turkey. 
Gibson argues that ‘[t]he Court in Sahin focuses on the ‘issue’ of religious 
dress in an educational context; arguably, however, its primary concern is the broader 
“issue” of religion's relationship with the state and, specifically, Turkish 
secularism’.107 The Commission adopted this line of reasoning in the case Karaduman 
v. Turkey.108  
In Karaduman, the University of Ankara did not issue a certificate proving that 
the applicant obtained a Bachelor’s Degree because she was wearing a religious 
headscarf on the photograph she provided. This photograph did not comply with 
university regulations. In assessing the merits of the case the Commission pointed out 
that: 
 
Especially in countries where the great majority of the population owe 
allegiance to one particular religion, manifestation of the observances 
and symbols of that religion, without restriction as to place and manner, 
                                                            
106
 T Lewis, 'What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, and the Margin of Appreciation' 
(2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 395, 412. 
107
 Gibson (n 71) 680. 
108
 Karaduman v. Turkey (1993) DR 74 93.   
may constitute pressure on students who do not practise that religion or 
those who adhere to another religion.109 
 
This argument seems like a clear reference to cultural justification of the 
restrictions in question and supports the European Court of Human Rights’ departure 
from the European consensus doctrine. Such reasons should be real and convincing in 
order to rebut the presumption established by European consensus. 
Thirdly, new legislation may constitute a new step forward in human rights 
development. The evolution of laws in European states is an everyday process. New 
laws can appear to be in a minority position immediately after adoption, only to later 
become part of a pan-European trend. If the transsexuals’ rights cases110 came before 
the Court sixty years ago, it could easily find European consensus in non-recognition 
of the rights of transsexuals. 
If the European Court of Human Rights uses the consensus doctrine without 
preceding analysis, it may become a tool for stagnation and preservation of the status 
quo. The problem lies in recognising this new trend. Brems supposes that the Court 
may refer to other international texts.111 Indeed, it may be useful for the identification 
of a trend in international human rights law. The Court may take into account the 
findings of different institutions in examining a certain area of law and the opinions of 
well-known lawyers and human rights defenders. It is noteworthy that the Court often 
builds its judgments on international treaties and accepts amicus curiae by human 
rights non-governmental organisations. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Comparative law serves a very practical purpose in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ case law. It is no longer an amusing academic puzzle which lacks any 
useful application. However, this practical purpose is not universal and comparative 
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law serves two specific functions. The Court employs comparative law for an 
informative purpose if it is designed to map a spectrum of particular solutions to legal 
matters in question. Otherwise, comparative law analysis serves as persuasive 
authority for the findings of the Court.  
In so doing, a broader question arises as to whether the European Court of 
Human Rights should use comparative law in its decision-making at all. The Court is 
charged with supervising the compliance of Contracting Parties with the Convention 
and the comparative data comes directly from the States under its supervision. 
However, the way in which the Convention is phrased occasionally gives the Court  
space for more than mere interpretation, an opportunity more comparable to law-
making, which cannot be exercised in a vacuum if it is to be legitimate. The Court 
needs ground on which to base its findings and an instrument to check the 
appropriateness of its interference. Moreover, the way in which the Court uses 
comparative analysis must not pose a threat to human rights protection provided by the 
Convention, since the existence of European consensus, or lack thereof, do not 
establish an absolute presumption of acceptance of the particular rule. It can readily be 
rebutted by alternative means of reasoning. 
The European Court of Human Rights faces important challenges in 
conducting its comparative analysis. Legal terms translation, adequacy, cultural and 
contextual propriety of comparison and law cherry picking are among the most 
crucial, applicable to both academic comparison and comparative analysis undertaken 
by the Court. The Court, however, arguably finds itself in a better position than 
academics due to its international character and the plethora of lawyers from all forty 
seven Member States at its disposal. Moreover, recent developments, namely the 
establishment of the Research Unit which is well equipped to produce reliable and 
objective comparative studies, eliminate some of the problems that academics have to 
endure. 
The comparative analysis of the European Court of Human Rights goes 
through a number of stages. They can be divided in two major groups: collecting of 
and assessing the data. These two stages of research are conducted by different organs 
and at different stages of proceedings. The collection of the data is conducted by 
national lawyers and accumulated in the Research Unit; its assessment is completed by 
judges.  
Judges of the Court might come to the conclusion that consensus on the matter 
at issue exists or is lacking. In the former case the presumption is that the law which 
contradicts the European consensus should be held as a breach of same and, in the 
latter case, the Court leaves the issue to the state’s discretion. However, these 
presumptions can be rebutted. If the Court is in a position to find consensus, it may not 
follow it if the state has particularly persuasive reasons to maintain its particular 
legislation. In the circumstances where there is a lack of consensus, the European 
Court of Human Rights can still deem the law in question to be a violation of the 
Convention if it is manifestly unreasonable.  
